Beyond the pleasure principle

by Sigm. Freud.Authorized

Introduction

“Lacan and Freud: Beyond the Pleasure Principle.” sets out to explore Freud‟s (1920) Beyond the Pleasure Principle, so as to rediscover important themes and concepts which could influence a contemporary understanding of Psychoanalysis. Lacan and Freud are presented side by side, not only to demonstrate the influence and effects of Lacan on Psychoanalysis, but also the effects of Freud on Lacan. Consequently, the emphasis isn‟t placed on Lacan‟s “return to Freud”, as Lacan has introduced concepts and terms that have altered the way Psychoanalysis is perceived today.

This thesis is a sustained analysis of Sigmund Freud‟s Beyond the Pleasure Principle. It argues that this text is seminal, not only for Freud‟s subsequent works, but also for the works of Jacques Lacan. This is not a free interpretation of Freud or Lacan, but a rigorous reading of the primary texts. What makes this thesis different and new in many regards is the incorporation of Freud‟s (1950) A Project for a Scientific Psychology. Psychology, a posthumously published manuscript that provides a different framework to describe and define the pleasure and the reality principle. It therefore becomes a question as to how Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology changes or adapts our understanding of the pleasure principle and in turn, of Psychoanalysis.

Freud‟s words might seem to corroborate Pervin and John‟s definition of the reality principle. However, Freud illustrates that the reality principle is the delay of pleasure until it can be achieved, which means that the reality principle is not a conditional principle that aims for a delay until maximum pleasure can be obtained.

Another example in an undergraduate psychology textbook is Meyer, Moore, and Viljoen‟s (2003) definition of the reality principle:

This contains the idea that the ego takes physical and social reality. into account by using conscious and preconscious cognitive processes such as sensory perception , rational thinking, memory and learning. Instead of the id‟s futile attempts at drive satisfaction by means of fantasy and wish fulfilment, the ego uses reality testing, object choice and object cathexis, which means that the ego tries to establish on rational grounds whether or not an object is serviceable. (p. 54, their italics)

Their conception of the reality principle is also connected to a conscious and rational thought process, whereby the reality principle is also a conditional procedure that only functions under certain circumstances. They go on to define the secondary process as follow:

The two definitions of the reality principle provided by two different undergraduate textbooks illustrate two varying yet similar descriptions. This thesis proposes a modest reading, where the reality principle proves more fruitful through a simplistic definition in line with Freud‟s (1950) Project for a Scientific Psychology. The application of this simpler definition increases its scope.

Another concept that provides difficulties is Lacan‟s description of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. However, this thesis does not define, but aims to illustrate and demonstrate the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real. The reason for not defining and then applying the definition is that they are emergent properties1 , rather than a priori descriptions. The problem of defining the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real can be illustrated through Meyer, Moore and Viljoen‟s (2003) definitions. According to them the Imaginary “is associated with images and imagery, is ontogenetically older than the symbolic order” (p. 219). The most important description of the symbolic order is “Language controls the symbolic order” (p. 221). As for the Real: “The real, for Lacan, includes contact with that which lies outside the limits of meaningful structuring and which cannot be interpreted as a meaningful whole” (p. 223). Unfortunately, Meyer, Moore and Viljoen (2003) don‟t sufficiently explain the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real, or how they are connected. A better illustration is to explain the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real in terms of a game of chess. The Symbolic can be illustrated by the chessboard and pieces with the rules that dictate how the game is played, and includes as how the pieces move. The Imaginary is illustrated by means of the description of each piece whereby the Knight differs from the Bishop, and the Queen from the King. The Real is the indeterminable aspects, such as player skill, the impact of time control, or just pure luck. The Real is always the unknowable as illustrated in a chess game, which is why the outcome is always in doubt.

Jean Baudrillard is one of the biggest detractors of Psychoanalysis. His critique will be summarized here, as well as the relevant response. This will demonstrate the wider application of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Baudrillard‟s (2000) Symbolic Exchange and Death criticizes the relation between the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real; he defines the Symbolic and its relation to the Imaginary and the Real as:

The symbolic is neither a concept, an agency, a category, nor a „structure‟, but an act of exchange and a social relation which puts an end to the real, which resolves the real, and, at the same time, puts an end to the opposition between the real and the imaginary. (p. 133, his emphasis)

Baudrillard‟s critique is that the symbolic overwrites both the Imaginary and the Real, and consequently “puts an end to the opposition”. Lacan already acknowledges the primacy of the Symbolic and the destructive nature of the signifier, as seen when the signified is replaced by the signifier and consequently becomes known as the signifier. As Ferdinand de Saussure (1960) explains, the signifier is not the signified, but is connected through an arbitrary relation. For Freud and Lacan, the signifier is a close approximation, but since it is not an exact match, the Imaginary and the Real are lost. It is for this reason that Lacan emphasizes a language theory, which is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2. For Baudrillard (2000), Psychoanalysis‟ understanding of the relation between the signifier and the signified can be summarized as follow:

It is certain, however, that Psychoanalysis has given the signifier-signified relation an almost poetic slant. The signifier, instead of manifesting the signified in its presence, is in an inverse relation with it: it signifies the signified in its absence and its repression, in accordance with a negativity that never used to appear in linguistic economy. The signifier is in a necessary (not arbitrary) relation with the signified, but only as the presence of something is with its absence. It signifies the lost object and takes the place of this loss. (p. 225)

It is certain, however, that Psychoanalysis. has given the signifier-signified relation an almost poetic slant. The signifier, instead of manifesting the signified in its presence, is in an inverse relation with it: it signifies the signified in its absence and its repression, in accordance with a negativity that never used to appear in linguistic economy. The signifier is in a necessary (not arbitrary) relation with the signified, but only as the presence of something is with its absence. It signifies the lost object and takes the place of this loss. (p. 225)

The entire architecture of the sign must be demolished, even its equation must be broken, and it is not enough merely to multiply the unknown factors. Alternatively, then, we must assume that Psychoanalysis still makes room somewhere for a certain mode of signification and representation, a certain mode of value and expression: this is in fact precisely what Mannoni‟s „empty‟ signified stands for – the place of the signified remains marked as that of the mobile contents of the unconscious. (p. 227)

For Baudrillard, the relation between the signifier and the signified is at stake in terms of the production of meaning outside of the unconscious. He takes issue with Psychoanalysis because it continually connects the signified to unconscious processes whereby the unconscious has a fixed meaning, which Freud maintains is inaccessible. Properties that emerge from the unconscious are only fragments that do not give the full detail of the unconscious, but are just that, incomplete fragments. Baudrillard continues: There is no longer a means of unblocking the system, forever caught fast in the obsession with meaning, in the fulfilment of a perverse desire that comes to fill the empty form of the object with meaning. In the poetic (the symbolic) the signifier disintegrates absolutely, whereas in Psychoanalysis it endlessly shifts under the effect of the primary processes and is distorted following the folds of repressed values. (p.227, his emphasis)

Baudrillard‟s critique is therefore aimed at the source of the „value‟ the signified has, and more specifically with the way that Psychoanalysis locates the source of „value‟ in the unconscious.

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